Just as in Linux kernel it could be possible to do the same type of attack from a Trusted Application as being described in the Meltdown whitepaper. I.e., under some conditions the CPU would read and execute instructions speculatively before the CPU handles the illegal access (traps).
The mitigation ideas are the same as with KPTI, i.e, we keep the amount of kernel memory being mapped to a minimum when running in usermode. It should also be noted that there are currently no known devices running OP-TEE who are susceptible to the Meltdown attack. Still we have decided to move on and merged the mitigation patches, since we believe that this gives additional security and it also means that we are prepared if/when we find OP-TEE running on Cortex-A75.
Patches
optee_os.git
Workarounds
N/A
References
All details about the attacks has been thoroughly described in the whitepapers that can found at the Meltdown and Spectre page. A blog post (Implications of Meltdown and Spectre : Part 1) is also available on the Linaro website.
OP-TEE ID
OP-TEE-2018-0003
Reported by
For more information
For more information regarding the security incident process in OP-TEE, please read the information that can be found when going to the "Security" page at https://www.trustedfirmware.org.
Just as in Linux kernel it could be possible to do the same type of attack from a Trusted Application as being described in the Meltdown whitepaper. I.e., under some conditions the CPU would read and execute instructions speculatively before the CPU handles the illegal access (traps).
The mitigation ideas are the same as with KPTI, i.e, we keep the amount of kernel memory being mapped to a minimum when running in usermode. It should also be noted that there are currently no known devices running OP-TEE who are susceptible to the Meltdown attack. Still we have decided to move on and merged the mitigation patches, since we believe that this gives additional security and it also means that we are prepared if/when we find OP-TEE running on Cortex-A75.
Patches
optee_os.git
Workarounds
N/A
References
All details about the attacks has been thoroughly described in the whitepapers that can found at the Meltdown and Spectre page. A blog post (Implications of Meltdown and Spectre : Part 1) is also available on the Linaro website.
OP-TEE ID
OP-TEE-2018-0003
Reported by
For more information
For more information regarding the security incident process in OP-TEE, please read the information that can be found when going to the "Security" page at https://www.trustedfirmware.org.